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Abstract
This paper analyzes optimal taxation and risk-sharing arrangements in an
economy with two levels of government. Both levels provide public goods and
￿nance their expenditures via labor income taxation, where the tax base is
responsive to the private agents￿ labor supply decisions. The localities are
assumed to experience diﬀerent random productivity shocks, meaning that
the private labor supply decision as well as the choices of income tax rates
are carried out under uncertainty. Part of the central government￿s decision
problem is then to provide tax revenue sharing between the local govern-
ments. The optimal degree of revenue sharing depends on whether or not the
localities/regions diﬀer with respect to labor supply incentives.
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11 Introduction
This paper concerns optimal taxation and risk-sharing arrangements in an economic
federation, where tax and expenditure decisions are being made by both local and
central levels of government. Each locality (or region) is assumed to experience a
random productivity shock, implying that the private agents as well as the policy
makers optimize under uncertainty. The main purpose is to examine how the central
government can improve the resource allocation by means of policies designed to
aﬀect the behavior of local governments.
The paper relates to (and tries to combine) earlier literature in primarily two
￿elds: (i) optimal taxation and provision of public goods under ￿scal externalities
and (ii) ￿scal arrangements for risk-sharing. In the literature on ￿scal externalities,
it has been recognized that if the local (lower level) governments act as Nash com-
petitors to one another, then the resulting outcome in terms of taxes and publicly
provided goods is generally suboptimal from society￿s point of view. One reason
is the presence of horizontal ￿scal externalities: the decisions made by one locality
aﬀect the residents in other localities either because of mobility across localities or
bene￿t spillover from local public goods1. A second reason is the presence of vertical
externalities, which arise from co-occupancy of a common tax base. Typically, the
local authorities do not recognize that their policies aﬀect the central authority￿s
tax base. This was pointed out by e.g. Hansson and Stuart (1987) and Johnson
(1988). To internalize the vertical externality, Boadway and Keen (1996) and Boad-
way et al. (1998) propose that the power of taxation be assigned to one level only
(i.e. the optimal tax rate for the central government is zero), whereas Aronsson and
Wikstr¤ om (1999) show that taxation at the central and local levels of government
can be combined with an intergovernmental transfer scheme inducing the correct
incentives.
Fiscal arrangements for risk-sharing have been examined both theoretically and
empirically. Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha (1996) analyze risk-sharing among the
1The standard reference here is Oates (1972). Wildasin (1991) shows that horizontal external-
ities arising from mobility can be internalized by means of a system of matching grants from the
central to the local governments.
2states in the U.S. by means of econometric methods. They ￿nd that, even if the cap-
ital and credit markets appear to be the most important mechanisms for interstate
risk-sharing, some 13 per cent of shocks to the ￿gross state product￿ are smoothed
by the federal government. The ￿gures presented by Sala - I - Martin and Sachs
(1992) suggest that the federal government plays a much more important role in
the context of risk-sharing: a negative shock in state income of one dollar leads the
federal government to decrease taxes by 35 cents and increase transfer payments by
approximately 30 cents. In any case, these and other empirical studies suggest that
the tax-transfer system is an important mechanism for risk-sharing2 in an economic
federation and, therefore, worth further research.
At a theoretical level, Persson and Tabellini (1996a) study risk-sharing as part
of the ￿scal policy in an economic federation with two levels of government. Their
results suggest a tradeoﬀ between federal risk-sharing and moral hazard in the
sense that federal risk-sharing may induce local governments to undertake poli-
cies that increase the local risk. Similarly, Persson and Tabellini (1996b) point
at a tradeoﬀ between risk-sharing and redistribution, and show that a federal so-
cial insurance scheme (chosen by federation-wide voting) will provide overinsurance,
whereas an intergovernmental transfer scheme (chosen by bargaining between the
regions/localities) provides underinsurance. Lockwood (1999) analyzes the decision
problem of a central government, which can use intergovernmental grants to insure
local governments against locality speci￿c random shocks. The central government
then faces the problem of trading oﬀ insurance of the localities against oﬀering
correct incentives for local public good provision. Depending on the source of the
shocks, the grant program may either induce oversupply or undersupply of local
public goods relative to the Samuelson rule.
The previous studies on ￿scal arrangements for risk-sharing commonly treat
private incomes as exogenous conditional on the state of nature, meaning that the
eﬀects on the tax base arising from labor supply behavior and/or mobility are being
2Sorensen, Wu and Yosha (2001) ￿nd that state budget surpluses are procyclical in the sense
that an increase in the gross state product increases the budget surplus. A possible interpretation
is that state and local governments use the budget surplus to smooth the disposable income of the
state residents.
3neglected3. In this paper, we assume that the labor supply is endogenous, and that
both levels of government ￿nance their expenditures via labor income taxation. The
localities are assumed to experience diﬀerent random productivity shocks, implying
that the private labor supply decision and the governments￿ choices of income tax
rates are carried out before the real wage rates have become realized. To be able to
study the consequences of endogenous labor supply in the context of risk-sharing,
we shall disregard any horizontal externalities. We also refrain from discussing
moral-hazard problems, which are addressed elsewhere in this literature. The paper
contributes to the literature in at least two ways. The ￿rst is by analyzing risk-
sharing as part of the optimal tax policy, which enables us to address vertical ￿scal
externalities and risk-sharing simultaneously. The second contribution is to show
that the optimal arrangement for risk-sharing within the public organization depends
on whether or not the localities diﬀer with respect to labor supply incentives.
Section 2 analyzes a ￿benchmark￿ version of the model, where all localities are
identical before the real wage rates have become realized, i.e. all diﬀerences between
the localities with respect to the realized real wage rates are due to the assumption
that they experience diﬀerent random shocks. We show that the socially optimal
(second best) resource allocation involves ￿full insurance￿ in the sense that the out-
come of the productivity shocks in terms of tax revenues is shared equally between
the local governments. This result is interesting in the sense of providing an eﬃciency
argument in favor of tax revenue-sharing across localities. Such revenue-sharing is
common in the Nordic countries and motivated primarily on the basis of distribu-
tional objectives. To implement the second best resource allocation, the central
government announces a policy rule which simultaneously internalizes the vertical
externality and redistributes tax revenues between the local governments. Section 2
3An interesting exception is Lockwood (1999), who brie￿y addresses distortionary taxation
in the context of intergovernmental grants and risk-sharing. By assuming Cobb-Douglas prefer-
ences, he ￿nds that the structure of taxation (i.e. whether taxes are lump-sum or distortionary)
may be important for the qualitative properties of the optimal intergovernmental grant. See also
Lee (1998), who analyzes income redistribution under uncertainty. Lee considers the question of
whether the federal government or the local governments should redistribute income, when the
localities are subject to diﬀerent random shocks and the labor force is mobile across localities.
4also addresses the conditions under which a centralized resource allocation system
gives rise to a higher income tax rate than would be chosen, if all tax revenues are
collected by the local governments.
In Section 3, we extend the analysis by assuming that part of the diﬀerences in
labor productivity (or realized real wage rates) between the localities is deterministic
and observed before the random shocks have become realized. This means that the
labor supply incentives will diﬀer across localities. The main result here is that, even
if the central government can improve the resource allocation by means of revenue-
sharing, full insurance is no longer optimal. The intuition is that, if the labor supply
behavior diﬀers across localities, the outcome of the productivity shocks in terms
of tax revenues will not cancel out at an aggregate level. Section 4 concludes the
paper.
2 The Benchmark Model
The federation consists of N localities, each of which is populated by one immobile






where c is private consumption, l labor supply, x a local public good provided
by the local government and G a federal public good provided by the central (or
federal) government. We assume that u(c,l)i si n c r e a s i n gi nc, decreasing in l and
strictly concave. The other parts of the utility function are assumed to obey the
conditions φx > 0, φxx < 0, ζG > 0a n dζGG < 0, where the subindices denote partial







where w i st h er e a lw a g er a t e ,τl the local income tax rate and τc t h ei n c o m et a x
rate chosen by the central government.
4To simplify the analysis, we follow Boadway and Keen (1996) and Boadway et al. (1998) by
assuming that public goods are additively separable from other goods.
5The real wage rate contains a deterministic part, which is identical across local-
ities, and a stochastic part. We de￿ne the realized real wage rate as
w
i = w + γε
i (3)
with E[εi]=0a n dσ2
ε = 1. To rule out the possibility of negative real wage rates,
we assume that Pr(εi > −w/γ) = 1. We can, therefore, interpret wi as a positive
stochastic variable with mean w and standard deviation γ.
We shall make two assumptions about the order in which the decisions are being
made. First, the choices of income tax rates as well as the private agent￿s labor
supply decision are made before the random shocks have become realized. Second,
following the convention in the optimal tax literature, we also assume that the
income tax rates are chosen before the private agents determine their labor supply,
meaning that the private agent in each locality optimizes subject to a set of ￿xed
tax parameters.








in which case the supply of labor can be written as li = l(w,γ,τi
l +τc). The realized
consumption can then be calculated by substituting the labor supply into equation
(2).











as a short notation for the ￿private￿ part of the expected indirect utility function.






which is assumed to be the objective function of the local government. In a similar
way, we assume that the objective of the central government is the sum of the
expected indirect utilities taken over all localities.
62.1 Centralized Policy Decisions
Suppose, to begin with, that all decisions regarding taxation and provision of pub-
lic goods are being made by the central government. To facilitate the comparison
between centralized and decentralized decision making (the latter is to be exam-
ined in the next subsection), we would like to make two additional assumptions.
First, there is no ￿aggregate productivity shock￿, which is here taken to imply that
(1/N)
!N
i=1 εi = 0. This means that there is a suﬃcient number of localities to en-
sure that the in￿uences of shocks on the real wage rates cancel out on an aggregate
level. Second, risk-sharing at the private agent level is not feasible5. The reason for
making the second assumption is that such risk-sharing would in principle require
lump-sum taxation, which has already been ruled out by the assumption that the
tax revenues are collected via distortionary taxes. The second assumption will im-
ply that our model is comparable with those in previous studies on vertical ￿scal
externalities mentioned in the introduction.
Note that the central government￿s decision problem will, in this case, be to
choose taxation and provision of public goods to maximize the sum of expected util-
ities subject to the public resource constraint for the economy as a whole, meaning
that the decision problem of a centralized policy maker coincides with the social
optimization problem. The resource constraint facing the centralized policy maker
is deterministic, since the outcome of productivity shocks in terms of tax revenues
cancel out at an aggregate level. When all policy decisions are being made by the
central government, there is no need to distinguish between local and central (or
federal) income tax rates, so we can de￿ne τi = τi
l + τc to be the income tax rate
facing the resident in locality i. In addition, since there are no observed diﬀerences
between the localities before the real wage rates have become realized, the optimal
tax and provision of public goods will be the same in all localities. We can then drop
the superindex i (for locality) and write the social optimization problem as follows;
5As was pointed out to us by Oved Yosha, the parameter γ may be interpreted as a measure
of the degree of market insurance, provided that this insurance is exogenous in the model. This
interpretation suggests that if γ is small (large), most (almost none) of the variability of ε has been




N[τwl(w,γ,τ) − x] − G =0 ( 6 )
In addition to equation (6), which is the resource constraint of the optimization
problem, the necessary conditions become
vτ + λ[wl + τwlτ]=0 ( 7 )
φx − λ =0 ( 8 )
NζG − λ =0 ( 9 )
where lτ = ∂l/∂τ, vτ = ∂v/∂τ, φx = ∂φ/∂x and ζG = ∂ζ/∂G.T h e v a r i a b l e λ
is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint. Note that the
term within brackets in equation (7) represents the slope of the so called ￿Laﬀer
curve￿, i.e. the relationship between the total tax revenues and the income tax rate.
Since vτ ≤ 0 by the properties of an indirect utility function, equation (7) implies
that the tax revenue is a nondecreasing function of the tax rate at the equilibrium.
Throughout this paper, we will assume that the tax revenue is a strictly increasing
function of the income tax rate; l + τlτ > 0. For further reference, denote the
outcome of the social utility maximization problem by (τ∗,x ∗,G ∗).
2.2 Decentralized Policy Decisions
In this subsection, we shall contrast the centralized resource allocation system with
a decentralized system, where all tax revenues are being collected by the local gov-
ernments. To be able to make this comparison, suppose that the central government
collects a fee from each locality in order to ￿nance its expenditures on the federal
public good. Since the localities are identical before the real wage rates have become
8realized, we can concentrate on the representative locality and drop the superindex
i. The budget constraint facing the local government is written
τwl(w,γ,τ) − x − Γ =0 ( 1 0 )
in which Γ is the fee collected by the central government. To be able to compare the
outcome of decentralized policy decisions with the choices made by the centralized
policy maker in the previous subsection, it is convenient to de￿ne the decentralized
decision problem conditional on the optimal allocation for the federal public good.
We assume that the central government chooses Γ = G∗/N (which is feasible, since
the central government is able to solve the hypothetical second best problem of
subsection 2.1 in order to determine G∗). Therefore, the only diﬀerence between the
centralized and decentralized decision problems will be that the budget constraint
is stochastic from the point of view of the local government.
Each local government chooses its income tax rate before the random produc-
tivity shock has become realized. More speci￿cally, the local government￿s decision
problem will be to choose income tax rate in order to maximize the expected utility
of the local resident. The provision of the local public good is then determined
residually from the budget constraint when the real wage rate has become realized.
The optimal tax problem can be written as
Max
τ v(w,γ,τ)+E[φ(τwl(w,γ,τ) − G
∗/N)] − ζ(G
∗)
where w = w + γε, and the expectations operator on the second term is due to the
fact that the budget constraint is stochastic from the local government￿s point of
view. The ￿rst order condition can be written
vτ + E[φx]w(l + τlτ)+cov(φx,ε)γ(l + τlτ)=0 ( 1 1 )
Note that the covariance between φx and ε is negative as a result of risk-aversion.
This is seen because sign cov(φx,ε)=sign [dφx/dε] < 0 due to the assumption that
φxx < 0.
Given that the choice of income tax rate in each locality obeys equation (11), is it
possible for the central government to improve the resource allocation by imposing
9a national (or federal) income tax on top of τ? Suppose that the additional tax
revenues are distributed as lump-sum grants of equal size to each local government.
Each local government can then respond by changing its income tax rate and/or
expenditures on the local public good. The additional tax rate imposed by the
central government (which is small by assumption) will be denoted by α.T h ev a l u e







where the ￿local policy variables￿ τ and xi, i =1 ,...,N, are functions of α.T h e
public good provided by the central government is not aﬀected by the reform. In
line with the assumption that the tax revenue increases with the tax rate, we shall
also require that the ￿eﬀective tax rate￿ facing a local resident, α + τi, is (locally)
increasing in the rate chosen by the central government, so ∂τi/∂α = τi
α > −1
around the equilibrium point de￿ned by equation (11). The cost bene￿tr u l ec a n
be derived by diﬀerentiating equation (12) with respect to α a n dt h e ne v a l u a t i n g
the resulting derivative at the point where α = 0 (which represents the prereform
resource allocation). Since the localities are identical before the real wage rates have
become realized, and since the risk associated with this marginal project is shared
equally among them, the cost bene￿t rule for α will be
∂V
∂α
= −Ncov(φx,ε)[l + τlτ][1 + τα] > 0( 1 3 )
Equation (13) is formally derived in the Appendix. We shall here be concerned with
the interpretation of equation (13);
Proposition 1 Suppose that all revenues from distortionary taxation are being col-
lected by the lower level of government and that the localities are identical before
the real wage rates have become realized. It is then possible for the central govern-
ment to improve the resource allocation by introducing a federal income tax on top
of the local rates and redistribute the additional tax revenues equally among the local
governments in the form of a lump-sum grant.
Proposition 1 means that the central government can improve the resource allo-
cation, when all prereform tax revenues are being collected by the lower level of
10government. An interpretation is that risk-sharing is welfare improving at the mar-
gin in an economy with decentralized policy decisions.
If the central government can improve the resource allocation by adding an in-
come tax on top of the local rates, a natural next question is whether the centralized
policy decisions of subsection 2.1 give rise to a higher income tax rate than the decen-
tralized framework set out here. Consider Proposition 2, which provides a suﬃcient
condition for a centralized resource allocation system to give rise to a higher income
tax rate than would be chosen by the local governments in the decentralized system;
Proposition 2 If the localities are identical before the real wage rates have be-
come realized, and if the preferences for local public goods are such that E[φx(x)] ≤
φx(E[x]) for all x, the centralized system will always give rise to a higher income
tax rate than the decentralized system.
Proof. Let τ0 be the income tax rate chosen by the identical localities and introduce
the short notations E[φx(τ0)] = E[φx(τ0wl0 − G∗/N)] and φx(τ0)=φx(τ0wl0 −
G∗/N). Then, by adding and subtracting φx(τ0)[wl0 +τ0wl0




























which is the central government￿s ￿rst order condition evaluated at the tax rate
chosen by the local governments. The second order suﬃcient conditions for maxi-
mization will then imply τ∗ > τ0.
In technical terms, this condition means that the marginal utility of local public
goods, φx(x), is a globally concave function. This will eﬀectively rule out the possi-
bility of decreasing absolute risk aversion and, therefore, the possibility of reducing
the disutility of risk by increasing the consumption of local public goods. In the
absence of such incentives - or more generally, if they are not ￿too strong￿ - risk
aversion will induce the local governments to choose a lower income tax rate than
11would be chosen by a central government, which is able to provide full insurance.
However, if φx(x) is not a globally concave function (a situation that may arise as a
consequence of decreasing absolute risk aversion), the comparison between the two
policy regimes with respect to the income tax rate will, in general, remain incon-
clusive. Finally, notice the connection between Propositions 1 and 2. If φx(x)i sa
globally concave function, this will be suﬃcient to ensure that τα > −1, which is an
assumption underlying Proposition 1. However, the converse result is not true: if
τα > −1 around the equilibrium point de￿ned by equation (11), it does not follow
that the condition in Proposition 2 is valid.
2.3 Implementation of Second Best in a Decentralized Econ-
omy
Let us now return to the framework set out in the beginning of Section 2, where
tax and expenditure decisions are made by both levels of government. Our concern
will be to study how the central government must act in order to make the local
governments behave in an optimal way from society￿s point of view. There are two
issues involved: internalization of vertical ￿scal externalities and risk-sharing.









i =0 ( 1 4 )
where T is a subsidy (positive or negative) from the central government to the local






l + τc) − T
i] − G =0 ( 1 5 )
which means that the central government has three policy instruments at its disposal;
τc, G and T.
Clearly, when the central government has perfect information about the prefer-
ences of local residents, and since the central government has the means to provide
12risk-sharing, it is actually able to solve the (hypothetical) social optimization prob-
lem described in subsection 2.1 in order to determine G∗.I ti sa l s oa b l et od e s i g nt h e
subsidy to each local government in such a way, that the distortions that would oth-
erwise arise from vertical externalities and risk-aversion are oﬀset. This is described
in Proposition 3;
Proposition 3 If the central government announces that the subsidy to local gov-










l + τc)( 1 6 )
where τc is any income tax rate imposed by the central government, then τi
l = τ∗−τc
and xi = x∗ will solve the local governments￿ optimization problems.









τwl(w,γ,τ) − x − G
∗/N
where τ = τl +τc (and we have used that the local tax rates will be identical). This
is equivalent to the social optimization problem of subsection 2.1.
Note that the central government announces this policy before the real wage
rates have become realized. The ￿nal term on the right hand side of equation
(16) means that the local governments are fully insured against risk in the social
optimum, since they will behave as if they face the average labor income (or tax
base). This pure revenue sharing between the local governments will not aﬀect the
central government￿s budget constraint, since
!N
i=1[w − wi]=0 . K n o w i n gt h i s ,
the central government can announce the revenue sharing part without information
about what the realized real wage rate will be for each locality. Since the revenue
sharing between the local governments is motivated by the desire to avoid risk, one
can interpret the third term on the right hand side of equation (16) as if it provides
13an eﬃciency argument in favor of ￿tax revenue equalization￿ within the local public
sector. Such systems (with more or less revenue equalization) have been common
in the Nordic countries and imply that the localities share the tax revenues or tax
bases within a nation-wide system.
The ￿rst two terms on the right hand side of equation (16) re￿ect (in principle)
what the optimal policy rule would be in the absence of uncertainty and has been
derived by Aronsson and Wikstr¤ om (1999). Note that the central government￿s
choice of τc will not aﬀect the nature of the policy rule as such; only the size of
the subsidy. In other words, when the central government is able to solve the
(hypothetical) social optimization problem, and is able to transfer resources between
the two levels of government, the central government￿s income tax will become a
redundant policy instrument.
3D e t e r m i n i s t i c W a g e D i ﬀerentials
An important assumption in the previous section is that all diﬀerences between the
localities with respect to the realized real wage rates are due to diﬀerent random
shocks. Even if this assumption is convenient and may provide a suitable starting
point, it is by no means realistic. We shall here relax this assumption and, instead,
assume that part of the ￿locality speci￿c￿ productivity is known before the random
shock has become realized.
The realized real wage rate of locality i will be written as
w
i = w + β
i + γε
i (17)
where βi represents the deterministic part of the locality speci￿c productivity. The
local resident will still be assumed to choose his/her labor supply before the random
shock has become realized. The utility maximization problem is given by
Max








in which case the labor supply becomes li = l(w + βi,γ,τi
l + τc), and consumption
is determined residually from the budget constraint when the random shock has
become realized.
143.1 Marginal Risk-Sharing in a Decentralized Framework
The purpose of this subsection is to study whether tax revenue-sharing is welfare
superior to a decentralized policy regime. Recall from the previous section that
the central government￿s income tax rate is a redundant policy instrument from
the point of view of internalization of the vertical ￿scal externalities. To begin
with, therefore, we assume that the central government￿s income tax rate is equal
to zero. In addition, we would like to simplify by conditioning the policy analysis
on the optimal allocation of the federal public good (as we did in subsection 2.2).
A convenient way of doing this without ￿rst solving the hypothetical second best
problem (which we do not intend to do here) is by introducing ￿local provision￿
towards the federal public good, which will be appropriately subsidized by the central







i]=0 ( 1 8 )
where gi is local government i￿s contribution towards the federal public good, so
!N
i=1 gi = G. The central government subsidizes local government i￿s contribution
towards the federal public good at the rate si and collects a lump-sum tax or fee from
local government i, Si. The convenience of introducing subsidized local provision of
the federal public good is that, by choosing this subsidy in a particular way (to be
described below) the federal public good will be allocated in an optimal way from
society￿s point of view conditional on the choice of tax rate and provision of the local
public good. This makes it easy to concentrate the analysis on tax revenue-sharing.






i − (1 − s
i)g
i − S
i =0 ( 1 9 )
where wi = w + βi + γεi,a n dt h es u b i n d e xo nt h el o c a li n c o m et a xr a t eh a sb e e n
dropped. The local government chooses income tax rate and local provision towards
the federal public good in order to maximize the expected utility, and the provision
of the local public good is then determined residually from the budget constraint
15when the real wage rate has become realized. The utility maximization problem can
be written as
Max










The ￿rst order conditions are given by






ilτi]=0 ( 2 0 )
−(1 − s
i)E[φxi]+ζG =0 ( 2 1 )
in which we have used the short notations li = l(w + βi,γ,τi)a n dlτi = ∂li/∂τi.
Clearly, if the central government chooses the subsidy such that si =( N − 1)/N,
equation (21) will be equivalent to the Samuelson condition, −E[φxi]+NζG =0 .
In what follows, we shall assume that the central government imposes this subsidy
on each local government, meaning that all of them will contribute to the federal
public good in accordance with the Samuelson condition.
Our concern will be to study whether the central government can improve the
resource allocation by introducing a small income tax on top of the local rates and
then redistribute the additional tax revenues between the local governments in the
form of lump-sum grants. To de￿n et h er e s o u r c ec o n s t r a i n tf o rt h ee c o n o m ya sa
whole, start by aggregating the local budget constraints given by equation (19).
Then, by using the fact that the central government￿s budget constraint changes to
read
!N
i=1[αwili +Si −sigi]=0 ,w h e r eα (which is assumed to be small) is the tax









i]=0 ( 2 2 )
where the local policy variables τi, xi and gi,f o ri =1 ,...,N, are functions of α,s i n c e
the local governments will respond to the policy reform conducted by the central
government.
To be able to focus on the eﬃciency aspects of risk-sharing, and since there are
diﬀerences between the localities which are observed before the real wage rates have
16become realized, only part of the additional tax revenues will be used for purposes
of revenue-sharing. More speci￿cally, we assume that the deterministic part of the
additional tax revenues collected from the resident of locality i is returned to local
government i, whereas the part of the additional tax revenues that depend on the
realization of the random productivity shocks is distributed equally between the local
governments. With these assumptions, the reform will have the following eﬀect on




















α =0 ( 2 3 )
which has been evaluated at the point where α = 0, and the subindices denote
partial derivatives.








i)] + ζ(G)] (24)
in which τi, xi and gi, for i =1 ,...,N, are functions of α,a n dG =
!N
i=1 gi.T h e
welfare change measure can now be derived by diﬀerentiating the value function in
equation (24) with respect to α, evaluating the derivative at the point where α =0






















For each locality, i,t h ec o s tb e n e ￿t rule consists of two terms: ￿rst, the welfare
gain of local risk reduction and, second, the cost facing the locality from having to
carry part of the risk associated with productivity shocks in all N localities. In this
particular case, however, there is no risk-sharing at all in the prereform equilibrium,
which means E[φxiεj]=E[φxi]E[εj] = 0 for j  = i. The intuition is that, when there
are no risk-sharing arrangements in the prereform equilibrium, the marginal utility
of local public goods in locality i does not depend on the tax revenues collected by














α] > 0( 2 6 )
We can interpret equation (26) as follows;
Proposition 4 Suppose that part of the diﬀerences in productivity between the local-
ities is observed before the random shocks have become realized, and that all revenues
from distortionary taxation are being collected by the local governments. The central
government can then improve the resource allocation by introducing an income tax
on top of the local rates, and distribute the part of the additional tax revenues that
depends on the random productivity shocks equally between the local governments in
the form of lump-sum grants.
It is important to emphasize that Proposition 4 only applies when there is no risk-
sharing at all in the prereform equilibrium. In this case, there are no costs associated
with a ￿preexisting￿ arrangement for risk-sharing. If the prereform equilibrium is
characterized by risk-sharing, the welfare eﬀect can go in either direction, which is
seen from equation (25).
3.2 Can ￿full insurance￿ be optimal?
In Section 2, where all localities are identical before the random shocks have become
realized, we found that full insurance against the risk associated with these shocks
is, indeed, the optimal policy. An interesting question then arises: is it possible
to rule out that full insurance is optimal, when the local governments diﬀer before
the random productivity shocks are realized? We shall interpret full insurance to
mean that the outcome of the productivity shocks in terms of tax revenues is shared
equally between the local governments. In other words, they will share the part of the
aggregate tax revenues that is determined by these productivity shocks. Therefore,













i − (1 − s
i)g
i − S
i =0 ( 2 7 )
where li = l(w + βi,γ,τi).
18Let us, for the moment, disregard how this risk sharing arrangement is imple-
mented, and simply assume that local government i chooses τi and gi to maximize
the expected utility subject to equation (27), while xi is determined residually from
the budget constraint when the stochastic part of the tax revenues are realized. It is
easy to show that the ￿rst order condition for gi will take the form of equation (21).
As in the previous subsection, we assume that the central government subsidizes the
local provision towards the federal public good in such a way, that the Samuelson
condition is ful￿lled. The ￿rst order condition for τi changes to read









ilτi]=0 ( 2 8 )
Now, suppose that the policies chosen by each local government, i,o b e ye q u a -
tions (21) and (28). We shall refer to this outcome by the term ￿full insurance
equilibrium￿. Consider next what happens if we introduce a small labor subsidy in
each locality, which is equivalent to a small uniform decrease of the income tax rates.
In addition, the subsidy given to local resident i is ￿nanced by a lump-sum fee paid
by local government i to the central government. If the labor subsidy is denoted by
θ, and by assuming that the reform is budget neutral at the local government level,





















θ =0 ( 2 9 )
which has been evaluated at the point where θ = 0. The value function looks like
equation (24) with the exceptions that (i) α is replaced by −θ, and (ii) the value
function is here evaluated in the full insurance equilibrium. By analogy to the
previous subsection, if we diﬀerentiate the value function with respect to θ,e v a l u a t e
the resulting derivative at the point where θ = 0, and then use equations (21), (28)















θ] > 0( 3 0 )
19The sign of equation (30) is explained by the character of the initial equilibrium.
Since all local income tax rates were optimally chosen subject to a ￿full insurance
constraint￿ prior to the reform, the local net bene￿ts associated with risk-sharing
are zero at the margin. Instead, the welfare eﬀect arises because the aggregate
tax burden on labor is being slightly reduced and, as a consequence, each local
government will be carrying a smaller fraction of the outcome of productivity shocks
in the other localities.
We have derived the following result;
Proposition 5 The full insurance equilibrium is suboptimal from society￿s point of
view. If the economy is in the full insurance equilibrium, the central government can
increase the welfare level by a policy designed to imply less risk-sharing.
4 Summary and Discussion
This paper concerns optimal taxation and risk-sharing arrangements in an economy,
where tax and expenditure decisions are being made by both central and local
governments. One important assumption is that the localities experience diﬀerent
random productivity shocks, meaning that the governments￿ choices of income tax
rates and the private labor supply decision are carried out before the real wage rates
have become realized. Another is that risk-sharing at the private agent level is not
feasible, and we concentrate the analysis on risk-sharing arrangements within the
public organization. The main purpose of the paper is to study how the central
government can improve the resource allocation by means of policies designed to
aﬀect the decisions made by the local governments.
When the localities are identical before the random productivity shocks have
become realized, the socially optimal resource allocation will imply that the local
governments are fully insured against risk. Since the labor supply is endogenous,
implementation of this resource allocation in a decentralized setting implies that
the central government simultaneously internalizes vertical ￿scal externalities and
designs a system for tax revenue-sharing within the local public sector. The latter is
particularly interesting, since it provides an eﬃciency argument in favor of ￿revenue-
20equalization￿ among local governments. Such systems are common in the Nordic
countries and are mainly motivated on the basis of distributional objectives.
If, on the other hand, part of the diﬀerences in productivity between the localities
is deterministic and observed before the random productivity shocks have become
realized, the localities will diﬀer with respect to how the local residents choose their
labor supply. As a consequence, even if the locality speci￿c, stochastic components
of the real wage rates cancel out on an aggregate level, diﬀerences in labor sup-
ply incentives across localities will introduce what resembles ￿aggregate risk￿. The
main result here is that, even if the central government can improve the resource
allocation by introducing risk-sharing in an otherwise decentralized policy regime,
full insurance at the local level of government is not optimal. This is explained by
the costs arising, when each local government has to carry part of the outcome of
random productivity shocks in the other localities.
5 Appendix
Derivation of equation (13)




= N{vτ[1 + τα]+E[φxxα]} (A1)
Since the localities are identical before the random productivity shocks have become
realized, and since the additional tax revenues are shared equally between the local
governments in the form of lump-sum grants, the change in the provision of the local
public good will be the same in all localities. The change in the provision of the
local public good is implicitly de￿ned by
[1 + τα]wl + τwlτ[1 + τα] − xα =0 ( A 2 )
which has been evaluated at the point where α =0 ,a n dw h e r el = l(w,γ,τ + α).
Solving equation (A2) for xα, substituting into equation (A1), while using vτ +
21E[φx]w(l + τlτ)=−cov(φx,ε)γ(l + τlτ) according to equation (11), gives equation
(13).
Derivation of equation (25)











By solving equation (23) for xi
α, substituting into equation (A3) and rearranging, we
can use equations (A3), (20) and (21) to derive equation (25). Note that the use of
equation (21) is based on the assumption that each local government￿s contribution
towards the federal public good obeys the Samuelson condition, so si =( N − 1)/N
for i =1 ,...,N.
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